For some founders, an interesting problem arises where they have a few happy customers who are thrilled with the product, but then they get stuck. The flow of new customers dries up, and sales cycles get longer. As they start to sell into larger organizations, there’s a lot of comments like “Send me some more information on that,” and “I really like this. But we’re not ready to buy right now.”

Geoffrey Moore was selling technology products and noticed that this was a recurring problem. He observed a pattern where startups would have promising launches but then “go off the radar.” Curious about why these companies disappeared after initial success, Moore hypothesized that there was a huge gap between the early buyers and those in the mass market (who showed up much later, if at all). He went on to write “Crossing the Chasm,” which has become one of the most influential business books of the last 30 years.

The key is that early buyers, whom Moore labels as “Innovators” and “Early Adopters,” are willing to put up with some headaches to enjoy the thrill of a new product. Software that crashes or requires extra effort to install doesn’t scare away these early buyers who don’t mind doing some extra work to stay on the cutting edge of technology.

The opposite is true of the mass market. These buyers require products to be headache free. For them, even reviewing an instruction manual is considered way too much work to figure out how to use an application.

The chasm between these two types of buyers leads to what in math terms is called non-linear growth, and it has a huge real-world impact on many startups. For founders it presents the question of whether you can survive the drop-off in sales long enough to get your product smoothed out so it’s easy enough for the rest of the world.

Moore makes the point that, if the product does have a viable market out there, the chasm gets filled with venture capital dollars – as well as the wreckage of companies that didn’t make it to the other side. Fortunately, Lever has experience in avoiding this pitfall.

Here’s one way around this problem. Instead of directly pursuing the mass market that demands an idiot-proof solution, look for a specific type of customer on the other side: those who have a use case that is so compelling (typically driven by significant pain) that they are willing to tolerate the product’s current shortcomings. These customers understand there’s still more work to be done but are motivated by the severity of their problem. The strategy is to commit 100% with this customer to solve their specific compelling use case. And, not just for them, but for everyone else in their industry who shares the same problem. This commitment encourages these customers to work with you on further refining your solution.

Moore uses the term Bowling Pin to describe this strategy: prove that you can knock down one specific pin. If you can do that, it will unlock that part of the market – earning you the sales needed to build the product out enough for the next pin. Continue to pick off the pins until you have a solution for not just a segment, but the whole market.

We’re happy to discuss these concepts further. Please contact us if you have any questions. Also, a word of warning from Moore, who notes that getting past this problem often leads to a new one: the big spike in customer demand once your product is finally ready for the mass market. Moore calls this “The Tornado,” and dealing with that will be the subject of a future article.